Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance (Registro nro. 25943)

Detalles MARC
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 00375 a2200109 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field ART_11914
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20260410161901.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 260409a
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Whinston, Michael D.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Moral hazard, adverse selection, and the optimal provision of social insurance
773 0# - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Journal of public economics
Related parts - Vol. 22, Nº 1 (oct. 1983)
Record control number REV11485

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